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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The plaintiff appeals an Order entered June 14, 1988 by the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge, Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, granting summary judgment
to the defendant, Dr. Hurst, on plaintiff's claims of dental
malpractice.

This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal based

on § 78-2-2(3)(j), U.C.A. (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Plaintiff's appeal raises two issues:
1.

Based on the record before the trial court, was there

a genuine issue of fact with respect to plaintiff's claim that
Dr. Hurst's treatment of her was below the applicable standard
of care and with respect to her claim that Dr. Hurst's treatment caused her alleged injuries? and,
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying

plaintiff's Motion for Continuance of the June 6, 1988 hearing
on Dr. Hurst's Second Motion for Summary Judgment?
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT RULES AND STATUTES
The following rules and statutes are relied upon by
Dr. Hurst in this brief:
1.

Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony;
defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall

set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When
a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him.
Section 78-14-5(1), U.C.A. (1953 as amended):
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered
by a health care provider, it shall be presumed
that what the health care provider did was either
expressly or impliedly authorized to be done.
For a patient to recover damages from a health
care provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to obtain informed consent, the
patient must prove the following:

(c) the patient suffered personal injuries
arising out of the health care rendered; and

(g) the unauthorized part of the health
care rendered was the proximate cause of
personal injuries suffered by the patient.
Section 78-14-4(1), U.C.A. (1953 as amended):
(1) No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is commenced
within two years after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four
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years after the date of the alleged act,
omission, neglect or occurrence . . . .
Rule 24(a)(7) and (e), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court:
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the
appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order here indicated:

(7) a statement of the case. The statement
shall first indicate briefly the nature of
the case, the course of proceedings, and its
disposition in the court below. There shall
follow a statement of the facts relevant to
the issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations
to the record (see Paragraph (e)).

(e) References in briefs to the record.
References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule
11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript, or
to pages of any statement of the evidence or
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant
to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits
shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is
made to evidence the admissibility of which is in
controversy, reference shall be made to the pages
of the transcript at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
Rule 33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court:
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If
the court shall determine that a motion made or
appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages
and single or double costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees, to the prevailing party.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a tort action in which plaintiff alleges dental
malpractice.

(R. at 2-5, Complaint) Plaintiff's claims arise

from orthodontic treatment rendered to her by Dr. Hurst, an
orthodontist licensed to practice in the State of Utah and a
Diplomate of the American Board of Orthodontics.

(R. at 15,

Aff'd of J. Earl Hurst, D.D.S., M.S., 1f 1)
The trial court granted Summary Judgment in favor of
Dr. Hurst because plaintiff was unable to adduce any expert testimony to establish the elements of her prima facie case and the
uncontroverted facts in the record establish that Dr. Hurst's
treatment of plaintiff was in accordance with the applicable
standard of care and did not cause her alleged injuries.
(R. at 196 & 197)
In June 1972 plaintiff, then 11 years old, was referred to
Dr. Hurst for orthodontic care by her general dentist, Jack
Karl Rasmussen, D.D.S., following a swimming pool accident and
injury to her lower front teeth.

(R. at 16, Aff'd of Hurst

1f 2; R. at 38, Aff'd of Jack Karl Rasmussen, D.D.S, 1f 3)
Dr. Rasmussen referred plaintiff to Dr. Hurst because of crowding of her lower anterior (front) teeth and because he felt the
treatment of the lower right central incisor, the most severely
injured tooth, should be considered in the context of a plan
for orthodontic care.

(R. at 38, Aff'd of Rasmussen if 3)

When plaintiff presented to Dr. Hurst in June 1972 the
lower right central incisor was fractured and the pulp exposed,
-4-

causing a large abscess and fistula.

Root canal therapy had

been performed on that tooth, but the prognosis was poor.
Three other lower anterior teeth were also abscessed, but the
prognosis for those teeth was better, given appropriate endodontic care.
were crowded.

Orthodontically, plaintiff's lower front teeth
(R. at 16, Aff'd of Hurst 1f1f 2 & 3; R. at 38,

Aff'd of Rasmussen 1f 3)
After careful diagnostic evaluation and consultations with
Dr. Rasmussen and plaintiff's father, it was agreed by them and
Dr. Hurst that the injured lower right central incisor would be
extracted and its space used to reduce the crowding of the
remaining lower anterior teeth, through the application of
braces.

It was believed that removal of the lower right

central incisor would also help resolve the infection around
the other lower anterior teeth.

(R. at 16, 17 & 20, Aff*d of

Hurst 1f1f 4 & 11; R. at 38, Aff'd of Rasmussen 1f 4)
In accordance with the treatment plan presented by
Dr. Hurst and agreed upon by Dr. Rasmussen and plaintiff's
father, the lower right central incisor was extracted and in
September 1972 Dr. Hurst commenced plaintiff's orthodontic
treatment.

By July 1974, in Dr. Hurst's and Dr. Rasmussen's

judgment, the goal of the orthodontic treatment had been
achieved and a good result had been obtained.

The lower

anterior teeth had been moved, reducing the crowding, and had
evenly taken up the space of the extracted lower right central

incisor.

(R. at 17, Aff'd of Hurst 1f 6; R. at 38 & 39, Aff'd

of Rasmussen 1f1f 5 & 7)

From 1974 through 1982 plaintiff

visited Dr. Hurst's office periodically, but only for minor
adjustments to her retainers or for new retainers.

Dr. Hurst

did not provide any treatment to plaintiff after 1974 which
changed the position of her lower teeth.

(R. at 17-18, Aff'd

of Hurst 1f1f 6 & 7; R. at 38, Aff'd of Rasmussen 1f 5)
In March 1985 plaintiff visited Dr. Hurst and requested
minor adjustments in the alignment of her upper anterior
teeth.

Dr. Hurst had not previously treated plaintiff's upper

teeth.

Bands were applied to plaintiff's upper teeth in March

1985 and removed in September 1985.

Plaintiff has not com-

plained or asserted any claims regarding the adjustment of her
upper teeth during 1985.

(R. at 17-18, Aff'd of Hurst 1f 7; R.

at 3-4, Plaintiff's Complaint 1f1f 7-9)
In September 1985 plaintiff complained to Dr. Hurst that
she wanted her lower right central incisor and her wisdom
teeth, which had also been extracted, but not by Dr. Hurst,
replaced because that was the way God created her.

She also

requested that Dr. Hurst return her lower anterior teeth to
their original positions.

Dr. Hurst advised plaintiff it would

not be in her interest or medically advisable to attempt to
restore her lower anterior teeth to their original positions
and that such an effort could possibly damage her then healthy
mouth.

He further advised her that even if her requests were
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feasible, it would cost her a substantial amount of money for
no benefit.

Plaintiff persisted in her request and Dr. Hurst

agreed to make a plaster study model of her teeth for evaluation.

After making the plaster study model and evaluating it,

Dr. Hurst advised plaintiff that it was not advisable to move
the lower anterior teeth back to their original positions and
refused to undertake such treatment.

(R. at 18, Aff *d of Hurst

1f 8)
When Dr. Hurst refused plaintiff's request, she became
angry and began harassing him and his office personnel.

Over

the next several months, Dr. Hurst received telephone calls
from eight other orthodontists, a specialist in craniofacial
pain, an endodontist, and a general dentist, advising that
plaintiff had made similar requests to them.

Each reported he

had declined to undertake the requested treatment and expressed
the opinion that plaintiff's orthodontic condition was then
healthy and normal.

(R. at 19, Aff'd of Hurst 1f 9)

On March 3, 1986, Dr. Hurst received a telephone call from
Richard Randle, D.D.S., M.S., an orthodontist who had examined
plaintiff.

Dr. Randle advised Dr. Hurst that plaintiff had

threatened to kill Dr. Hurst and then kill herself if she did
not get the treatment she was requesting.

(R. at 19, Aff'd of

Hurst 1f 10; R. at 26, Aff'd of Richard E. Randle, D.D.S.,
M.S.)

Out of concern over this threat and plaintiff's contin-

uing harassment, Dr. Hurst first contacted Dr. Duncan Wallace,

a psychiatrist who had been treating plaintiff, and then
contacted the State Attorney General's Office.

He was referred

to a city prosecutor, who commenced a proceeding against plaintiff and obtained an order restraining her from any contact
with Dr. Hurst for a period of six months.

At the end of the

six month period, Dr. Hurst received a Notice of Intent to
Commence a malpractice action.

(R. at 19, Aff'd of Hurst 1f 10)

This action was filed August 5, 1987.

(R. at 2) On

November 2, 1987 defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
(R. at 45) supported by the Affidavits of Dr. Hurst, (R. at 15)
Wallace B. Brown, D.D.S., an endodontist who treated plaintiff's lower front teeth which were injured in the swimming
pool accident (R. at 34), Richard E. Randle, D.D.S., M.S., an
orthodontist who examined plaintiff in January 1986 (R. at 23),
James L. Guinn, D.M.D., a dentist specializing in craniofacial
pain and temporomandibular joint dysfunction who examined plaintiff in July 1986 (R. at 37), Jack Karl Rasmussen, D.D.S.,
plaintiff's general dentist (R. at 37), and George R. Parker,
D.D.S., M.S., an orthodontist who examined plaintiff in
December 1985 (R. at 41).
These affidavits established the following:

(1) that the

treatment plan outlined for plaintiff in 1972 by Dr. Hurst was
appropriate (R. at 20, 26, 39 & 44), (2) that the orthodontic
treatment rendered by Dr. Hurst to plaintiff was, in all
respects, within the standard of care ordinarily exercised by
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other orthodontists (R. at 20, 26 & 44), (3) that the result
from the orthodontic treatment was good (R. 20, 39 & 44), (4)
that the endodontic damage to plaintiffs lower anterior teeth
in 1972 was caused by trauma to her teeth and not by the
orthodontic treatment (R. at 20 & 35), (5) that Dr. Hurst's
treatment did not cause any of plaintiff's teeth to die, did
not cause any damage to facial nerves and did not cause any
damage to her jaw or bite (R. at 20, 26, 28 & 39), and (6) that
any headaches, tension, pain or depression suffered by plaintiff were not caused or contributed to by her orthodontic
treatment.

(R. at 6, 26 & 28)

The bases of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment were
that the foregoing facts established by the affidavits filed in
support of the Motion were uncontroverted, that plaintiff could
not establish a prima facie case without competent expert testimony regarding the applicable standard of care and causation,
and that plaintiff's claims were based on treatment rendered
more than four years prior to commencing this action and were
thus barred by the four year statute of repose in S 78-14-4,
U.C.A. (1953 as amended).

(R. at 45-57)

Plaintiff filed

affidavits of herself (R. at 64), Charles Edward Gordon (R. at
65) and Gayle Dean Hunt (R. at 66), her father.

None of those

affiants set forth any credentials qualifying them to render
expert opinions regarding the standard of care for orthodontists, the quality of the orthodontic care rendered by

Dr. Hurst or the cause of plaintiff's alleged present condition
or symptoms.

Additionally, plaintiff filed a letter signed by

Joseph W. Stobbe, Jr., D.M.D., which stated "the purpose of
this letter is only to state that I began treatment of Mary
Alene Hunt on June 15, 1987 for temporomandibular joint
dysfunction."

The letter was not signed under oath and did not

comment on Dr. Hurst's treatment of plaintiff or the cause of
her alleged temporomandibular joint dysfunction.

(R. at 70)

On December 21, 1987, Judge Frederick heard Dr. Hurst's
Motion for Summary Judgment, including arguments by plaintiff's
counsel, and granted the motion.

(R. at 63)

In January 1988, plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from
Judgment supported by an Affidavit of Scott Daynes, D.D.S.
at 86 & 88)

(R.

Plaintiff's motion was heard on January 25, 1988

and on January 26, 1988, Judge Frederick issued a minute entry,
granting plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment and
vacating the Summary Judgment.

(R. at 85 & 89) An Order of

Summary Judgment had not been signed.
On March 18, 1988, defendant took Dr. Daynes' deposition.
The Affidavit of Dr. Daynes, which had been the basis for
vacating the Summary Judgment, stated in pertinent part:
4.
Miss Hunt has explained that in 1972 she had an
injured front tooth removed and orthodontia was used
to restore her bite.

7.
I don't think it's normal procedure to take out a
tooth to solve an orthodontic problem as described by
Miss Hunt.
8.
Assuming the foregoing I can state that I believe
Miss Hunt has been dentally mistreated and this is evidenced by the fact that recent alignment of her bite
by a splint (band-aid approach) has released her from
years of pain and self-image problems.
9.
Miss Hunt describes classic signs of the previously unidentified consequences of the procedure of
shifting bite through orthodontia.
10. I further believe that emotional problems can
result from undiagnosed and unabated pain and believe
that Miss Hunt is a member of the class of young white
females we have discovered are especially susceptible
to the orthodontic consequences above described. (R.
at 88)
In his deposition, Dr. Daynes testified:
1.

That he is a general dentist and does not claim
expertise in orthodontics. (Depo. of Scott P.
Daynes, D.D.S., at 5, 6 & 46)

2.

That when he signed the Affidavit, he was not
aware that extraction of lower incisors was
appropriate and acceptable orthodontic treatment
for reducing crowding of lower anterior teeth.
(id. at 48 & 49)

3.

That since signing the Affidavit, he had consulted an orthodontist with whom he was familiar
and it is now his understanding that extraction
of incisors to reduce crowding of lower anterior
teeth is acceptable orthodontic practice and in
many cases the preferred treatment. (Jd. at 48 &
49)

4.

That at the time he signed the Affidavit he had
not seen x-rays of the lower right central incisor extracted in 1972. (Id. at 17, 23, 24 & 56)

5.

That after having an opportunity to review the
x-ray of the extracted tooth at his deposition,
he agreed with Dr. Hurst's assessment that the

tooth had a poor prognosis and that extracting
the tooth was reasonable. (Id. at 56-58)
6.

That based on his examination of the plaintiff,
the history he took from her, his review of
Dr. Guinn's report and his discussions with
Dr. Parker, an orthodontist, it is not his
opinion that Dr. Hurst was in any way negligent
or breached the standard of care. (Id. at 55-56)

7.

That orthodontic treatment is only one of many
possible causes of plaintiff's symptoms. (I_d. at
43-46)

8.

That he never intended to state or suggest that
the orthodontic treatment rendered to plaintiff
by Dr. Hurst was or probably was the cause of her
problems. (Id. at 45-46)

Based on Dr. Daynes' deposition, defendant filed a Second
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Publish the
Deposition of Scott P. Daynes, D.D.S., in May 1988.
167)

(R. at

In opposition to defendant's Second Motion for Summary

Judgment, plaintiff filed an affidavit of Dallas E. Murdoch,
D.D.S. of Soda Springs, Idaho.

(R. at 175)

Dr. Murdoch

expressed his opinion that plaintiff had an "abnormal occlusal
relationship," but no opinion was expressed regarding the cause
of that condition or the propriety of the treatment rendered by
Dr. Hurst.

(R. at 175) On June 6, 1988, ten months after this

action was commenced, Judge Frederick granted defendant's
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. at 171) and on June 14,
1988 the Order and Summary Judgment from which this appeal is
taken was entered.

(R. at 196)

After Judge Frederick granted defendant's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment, plaintiff filed a "Motion to Deny Defendant's
-12-

Proposed Order:
from Judgment:

Motion to Open Judgment:

Motion for Relief

Motion for Stay of Proceedings" (R. at 178), an

Affidavit of John R. Bybee, who purports to have a Ph.D. in
"physiology and the training of science teachers" (R. at 185),
an Affidavit signed by plaintiff, dated June 10, 1988, with an
attached "resume" of alleged facts (R. at 186), another
Affidavit dated June 1, 1988, signed by plaintiff (R. at 191),
a letter dated June 8, 1988 to plaintiffs counsel from
Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys (R. at 192), a proposed contract dated June 1988 from Technical Advisory Service
for Attorneys (R. at 195), a letter dated June 7, 1988, to
plaintiff's counsel from the Medical Quality Foundation (R. at
193), a cassette tape, represented to be the tape of a lecture
presented by Henry Tanner, D.D.S., a Salt Lake City prosthodontist, in September 1986 (R. at 199) and a two-page transcript,
represented to be a transcript of certain portions of
Dr. Tanner's lecture (R. at 183).
On June 20, 1988, plaintiff's motions titled "Motion to
Deny Defendant's Proposed Order:

Motion to Open Judgment:

Motion for Relief from Judgment:

Motion for Stay of

Proceedings" were argued to the court and denied by Judge
Frederick.

(R. at 200-202)

On June 21, 1988, after the court had denied plaintiff's
motions, plaintiff filed a document entitled "Additional
Opinions" (R. at 203) with two attachments:

a letter "dictated

but not read" by Gordon J. Christensen, D.D.S, Ph.D. (R. at
204), and a handwritten note from John Richard Aoki, M.D., an
otorhinolaryngologist.

(R. at 205)

Dr. Christensen's letter

is not a sworn affidavit, is not signed by Dr. Christensen,
states it was not read by Dr. Christensen and does not express
an opinion that Dr. Hurst's treatment was in any way negligent
or in violation of the applicable standard of care.
204)

(R. at

Dr. Aoki's note, likewise, is not a sworn affidavit and

does not express an opinion concerning the treatment rendered
by Dr. Hurst.

(R. at 205)

On July 14, 1988, plaintiff filed the Notice of Appeal.
(R. at 246)

Thereafter, on September 20, 1988, plaintiff filed

a Motion for Relief from Judgment and an affidavit of Dennis J.
Michaelson, D.M.D., M.S., purportedly an orthodontist in
Chubbuck, Idaho.

These documents are the last twu pages in the

Court file before the clerk's index and are not numbered as
part of the record, presumably because they were filed after
the Notice of Appeal.

The affidavit does not express any

opinion concerning the orthodontic treatment rendered by
Dr. Hurst or the cause of plaintiff's present alleged symptoms.

There is no mailing certificate or affidavit of service

evidencing service of the Motion for Relief from Judgment or
Dr. Michaelson's sworn statement on defendant and defendant's
counsel hereby represents that copies were not received and
receipt of appellant's brief (Exhibit 11) was the first notice
to defendant of the Michaelson affidavit.
-14-

The letter from Grant B. Cannon, D.D.S., M.D., attached to
Appellant's Brief as Exhibit 10 is not found in the record and
likewise was never served on defendant.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This Court should affirm the Summary Judgment entered by
the District Court because there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying plaintiff's Motion for Continuance.
Plaintiff alleges Dr. Hurst committed dental malpractice
and that his treatment caused various injuries.

To establish a

prima facie case she must prove three elements:
1.

The standard of care applicable to Dr. Hurst,

2.

That Dr. Hurst's treatment of her breached the

applicable standard of care, and
3.

That the substandard treatment proximately caused her

alleged injuries.
Dr. Hurst filed affidavits of six competent dentists,
including himself, expressing competent expert testimony that
his treatment of plaintiff was appropriate and complied in all
respects with the applicable standard of care and that his
treatment did not cause plaintiff's alleged injuries.
The record contains no competent expert testimony
controverting the affidavits filed by Dr. Hurst or otherwise
raising a question of fact with respect to the elements of

plaintiff's prima facie case-

The only affidavit filed by plain-

tiff which even purports to express an expert opinion regarding
the treatment rendered by Dr. Hurst or the cause of plaintiff's
alleged injuries is the affidavit of Scott Daynes, D.D.S.
After Dr. Daynes' affidavit was filed, his deposition was
taken.

At his deposition, Dr. Daynes testified that he is a

general dentist and when he signed the affidavit, he was not
familiar with the standard of care ordinarily exercised by
orthodontists with respect to extraction of lower incisors to
correct crowding of lower anterior teeth.

After signing the

affidavit Dr. Daynes consulted an orthodontist and learned that
lower incisors are often extracted as part of orthodontic
treatment.

At his deposition, Dr. Daynes admitted he made an

erroneous assumption when he signed the affidavit and testified
it was not his opinion that Dr. Hurst breached the standard of
care ordinarily exercised by other orthodontists.
Additionally, Dr. Daynes viewed the 1972 x-ray of plaintiff's
lower right central incisor at his deposition and testified
that in his opinion, extraction of the tooth was reasonable.
Dr. Daynes further testified that orthodontic treatment was
only one of many possible causes of plaintiff's alleged
injuries and that he has no opinion as to the actual cause of
her symptoms.

He also explained that by signing the affidavit

he did not intend to express the opinion that plaintiff's
alleged symptoms were caused by Dr. Hurst's treatment.
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Plaintiff's argument that res ipsa loquitur applies and
therefore no expert testimony is required is without merit.
First, res ipsa was not raised in the trial court.

Second, res

ipsa only applies when the alleged incident would not normally
occur without negligence, the instrumentalities causing the
injuries are under the control of the defendant and the
incident occurred irrespective of any participation by the
plaintiff.

Those foundational requirements for res ipsa are

not present in this case.

Finally, res ipsa creates an

inference of negligence only and does not affect the requirement of proving causation with competent expert testimony.
Plaintiff's argument that Dr. Hurst failed to obtain her
informed consent is likewise without merit.

First, the claim

of failure to obtain informed consent was not raised in the
trial court and therefore cannot be considered by this Court on
appeal.

Second, to prevail on a theory of failure to obtain

informed consent, plaintiff must prove that the alleged
unauthorized treatment was the proximate cause of her alleged
injuries.

As discussed above, the affidavits filed by

Dr. Hurst establish that his treatment did not cause plaintiff's
alleged injuries and are incontroverted.
issue of fact regarding causation.
of fact regarding informed consent.

There is therefore no

Finally, there is no issue
Dr. Hurst and Dr. Rasmussen

testify in their affidavits that Dr. Hurst explained the proposed treatment to plaintiff's father and that her father agreed

to the treatment.

Plaintiff's father admits in his affidavit

that the proposed treatment was explained to him and he does
not dispute that he agreed to the treatment.

Plaintiff was a

minor and her father was authorized, by statute, to consent to
health care for her.
On June 6, 1988, the day scheduled for hearing Dr. Hurst's
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff filed a Motion
for Continuance asking the court to continue the hearing at
least three weeks.

The trial court's denial of that motion was

not an abuse of discretion because the lawsuit had been pending
for ten months, the affidavits of Dr. Hurst, Dr. Randle,
Dr. Guinn, Dr. Brown, Dr. Rasmussen and Dr. Parker had been on
file over seven months and plaintiff's Notice of Intent to
Commence a malpractice action had been filed nearly two and
one-half years earlier.

Additionally, four months earlier the

court had vacated a summary judgment giving plaintiff
additional time to file appropriate counter-affidavits.

The

lower court's denial of the Motion for Continuance was
therefore not an abuse of discretion.
The treatment which plaintiff claims was negligent was
rendered in 1972 through 1974.

Section 78-14-4, U.C.A. (1953

as amended) provides that no malpractice action against a
health care provider may be brought unless is it commenced
within four years after the date of the alleged negligent
treatment.

Accordingly, plaintiff's claims are barred.
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Dr. Hurst contends that this court should affirm the
Summary Judgment entered by the trial court because plaintiff
has failed to cite any portion of the record in support of her
appeal.

Without citing facts in the record which support

plaintiff's contentions on appeal, she cannot demonstrate any
factual basis for reversing the lower court.

Additionally,

Dr. Hurst contends this appeal is frivolous because it lacks
any reasonable legal or factual basis and the court should
therefore award him double costs and attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE
CASE OF PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE OR CAUSATION
WITHOUT COMPETENT EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THERE
IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT
DR. HURST'S TREATMENT WAS NEGLIGENT OR
CAUSED ANY INJURY.
To establish a prima facie case in a medical/dental malpractice case, the plaintiff must present competent evidence
establishing the following elements:
1.

The standard of care ordinarily exercised by practi-

tioners in the defendant's field of practice,
2.

That the defendant departed from the standard of care

ordinarily exercised by other practitioners in the same field
of practice, and
3.

That such departure from the applicable standard of

care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.

Nixdorf v.

Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980); Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah
2d 262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 94 Utah Adv.
Rep. 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Hoopilaina v. Intermountain
Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Except in the

unusual case where the propriety or impropriety of the medical
or dental treatment is within the common knowledge and experience of lay persons, these elements of a plaintiff's prima
facie case must be established by competent expert testimony.
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959);
Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra; Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah
1980); Chadwick v. Nielsen, supra; Hoopilaina v. Intermountain
Health Care, supra.
The rationale for requiring expert testimony is compelling.

The issues presented by medical/dental malpractice cases

generally involve technical questions and judgments beyond the
knowledge and experience of laymen.

Without the assistance of

expert testimony, the finder of fact would be left to impermissibly base its verdict on speculation and conjecture with
respect to the standard of care, whether the standard of care
was met or breached and whether the treatment caused the
alleged injuries.
This case clearly does not fall within the exception to the
general rule.

It cannot be said that laymen are sufficiently

knowledgeable to determine the propriety of Dr. Hurst's orthodontic treatment or whether such treatment caused the injuries
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of which plaintiff complains without help from experts in the
field of orthodontics.

Accordingly, plaintiff cannot rely upon

mere assertions or her own opinions.

She must produce competent

expert testimony that Dr. Hurst violated the applicable standard
of care and that his treatment caused her alleged injuries, to
make a prima facie case or create a question of fact.
A.

Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Because The Record In
This Case Contains Incontroverted And Competent Expert
Testimony That Dr. Hurst's Treatment Of Plaintiff
Complied In All Respects With The Applicable Standard
Of Care And Did Not Cause Her Alleged Injuries.

In his affidavit, Dr. Hurst outlines the treatment he
provided plaintiff, explains the objectives and results of the
treatment, and testifies that the treatment plan was appropriate, that the treatment rendered was in all respects within the
standard of care ordinarily exercised by other orthodontists
and that there were no complications of the treatment.

(R. at

15-22) Additionally, the record contains the following:
1.

The Affidavit of Richard E. Randle, D.D.S., M.S., a

practicing orthodontist in the Salt Lake City community for
twenty years, who examined plaintiff in January 1986.

(R. at

23-26) Dr. Randle incorporates in his affidavit, a statement
which he dictated at the time of his examination of the
plaintiff, which he testifies accurately states his findings
and opinions.

It states:

I advised her (plaintiff) that her tooth allignment
and bite were within normal limits and that her

previous orthodontist had done a good job in straightening and alligning her teeth . . .
After several visits, it became apparent to me that
her problem was psychological or emotional rather than
a physical problem relating to her dentition . . .
In my opinion, the orthodontic treatment done by
Dr. Hurst has been very satisfactory, and my hope is
that Mary can get professional help in overcoming her
emotional problems. (R. at 26)
2.

The Affidavit of George R. Parker, D.D.S., M.S., a

practicing orthodontist for seventeen years, who examined
plaintiff in late 1985.

(R. at 41-44)

Dr. Parker also

incorporates in his affidavit, a letter which he dictated to
plaintiff on December 3, 1985, which he attests accurately
states his findings and opinions with respect to her orthodontic condition at that time and her prior orthodontic
treatment.

He states:

After a thorough review of your mouth and occlusion we
have determined that to do any thing further in
orthodontics would not be to your advantage. The
results you have obtained are well within the normal
range of acceptable treatment and we feel that you
would be advised to leave the teeth and surrounding
tissues as they are.
You are really a very pretty girl and have much to
offer and we feel like you should not concentrate your
time and efforts on this situation. If you were my
very own daughter the advice would be the same. (R.
at 44)
3.

The Affidavit of James L. Guinn, D.M.D., a practicing

dentist in this community who limits his practice to craniofacial pain and T.M.J, dysfunctions.

(R. at 27-33)

examined plaintiff on July 30, 1986, and testifies:

Dr. Guinn

In my opinion, Mary's jaw and bite have not been
adversely altered or affected in any way by her orthodontic treatment. If she has in fact been suffering
facial pain or tension, it has not been caused by any
malocclusion or poor bite relationship. (R. at 28)
4.

The Affidavit of Jack Karl Rasmussen, D.D.S., a

practicing general dentist in this community for over twenty
years and plaintiff's general dentist since prior to 1972.
at 37-40)

(R,

Dr. Rasmussen testifies:

In my opinion, the treatment plan was entirely
appropriate and was the best course of treatment
available. In my opinion, the result of the orthodontic treatment was good and the objectives of the
treatment plan were fully achieved.
I am aware of Mary's claims and complaints regarding
the orthodontic treatment rendered by Dr. Hurst
through repeated discussions with Mary and with
Dr. Hurst. In my opinion, Mary's complaints are
psychological or emotional in origin and are not
factually or medically related to the orthodontic
treatment rendered. (R. at 39)
There is no competent evidence in the record controverting
the testimony of Dr. Hurst, Dr. Randle, Dr. Parker, Dr. Guinn
and Dr. Rasmussen regarding Dr. Hurst's treatment or causation.

According to Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P., plaintiff

cannot rely upon mere allegations, but must set forth specific
facts by competent testimony to create a question of fact and
avoid summary judgment.
Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P. provides:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matter stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories or further affidavits. When a motion
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
Of all the letters, statements and/or affidavits submitted
by plaintiff to the trial court and directly to this court, the
only one that purports to express an expert opinion regarding
the propriety of Dr. Hurst's treatment or comments on possible
causes of plaintiff's alleged injuries is the Affidavit of
Scott Daynes, D.D.S. All but the affidavits of Daynes and
Stobbe were filed after the second summary judgment was
granted.

Dr. Daynes' affidavit and deposition testimony are

addressed below.

All of the other statements, letters and

affidavits from purported experts and the reasons they do not
present competent evidence raising a question of fact are
addressed separately in the Addendum to this brief.
The trial court vacated the first Summary Judgment based on
Dr. Daynes' affidavit.
taken.

Thereafter, Dr. Daynes' deposition was

Based on a review of Dr. Daynes' deposition testimony,

the trial court concluded that his testimony did not create a
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question of fact with respect to negligence or causation and
again granted Summary Judgment.
In his affidavit (R. at 88), Dr. Daynes stated that in his
opinion orthodontia "can" cause a change of bite, which "could
cause" stress and pain in other parts of the body and that
plaintiff describes signs and symptoms which can result from a
change of bite due to orthodontia.

His affidavit does not

state that in his opinion the orthodontic treatment rendered by
Dr. Hurst caused or even "probably" caused plaintiff's alleged
symptoms.
Regarding the propriety of the orthodontic treatment plan
followed by Dr. Hurst, Dr. Daynes' affidavit states that he did
not "think" it is normal procedure to take out a tooth to solve
an orthodontic problem as described by plaintiff and that
"assuming" he is correct, he believes plaintiff has been
dentally mistreated.
Dr. Daynes' deposition revealed that he signed the affidavit
prepared by plaintiff's counsel, as a favor to his friend
Mr. Macri, after only one cursory examination of plaintiff, and
without reviewing any records or reports from dentists who had
previously treated or examined plaintiff.

(Depo. of Daynes at

17, 23-27 & 54) More importantly, however, Dr. Daynes
explained in his deposition that he is not an orthodontist and
the statement in his affidavit that he believed plaintiff had
been "dentally mistreated" was based on his perception as a

general dentist that it is not normal procedure to extract an
incisor for orthodontic treatment.

His understanding as a

general dentist was that bicuspids are normally extracted to
treat overcrowding.

Also, he had not seen the x-ray of the

incisor which was extracted.

After signing the affidavit, how-

ever, Dr. Daynes consulted an orthodontist and learned that
extraction of incisors is not unusual in orthodontic treatment
and is often the treatment of choice.

(Depo. of Daynes at 5,

6, 46, 48-51, 55 & 56) Additionally, at his deposition
Dr. Daynes had an opportunity to view a June 1972 x-ray of
plaintiff's lower right central incisor.

After reviewing the

x-ray, Dr. Daynes testified as follows:
Q.
Based on that x-ray, you would not now have any
criticism of that extraction of that tooth; is that
right?
A.
No, I have no criticism of the extraction of the
tooth for the dental reason, for the tooth reason. I
only had a question for the orthodontic reason. I
hope I clarified that, that I improved my opinion in
that area. (Depo. of Daynes at 58)
Dr. Daynes further testified:
Q.
Okay. And now that you've talked to Dr. Parker,
what is your opinion concerning the treatment rendered
by Dr. Hurst?
A.
Well, rather than get into Dr. Hurst but in
general, it seems to be guite normal treatment to
consider removing the incisors when tooth room and
spacing is needed.
And I didn't know that and now I know that, and I can
see that as a fact, and that's what happened to Mary
evidently, and that seems to be the standard of care
of a conventional orthodontic treatment.

Q. Based on all the information you have now, your
examination of Mary, the history you took from her,
Dr. Guinn's report, your discussions with Dr. Parker
and all other information that you have concerning
Mary today, do you either have the opinion or intend
to express any opinion in this litigation that
Dr. Hurst was in any way negligent or breached the
standard of care? Is that question too long?
A. No, sir, I understand the question. I want to
pause and reflect on it because it's obviously an
important question, and I feel there has been no
significant treatment which directly caused Mary's
problem either directly or indirectly, and I don't
look at the orthodontic treatment as the cause of
Mary's problem per se. It may be part of the problem
development, it may in some way be connected with it.
I just don't know, and I don't have any way of saying
that. I don't mean to say that. If I might, I'd
really have to reflect on this number eight paragraph
in my affidavit. I think I was beyond the bounds of
my normal dental experience in that statement, and I
kind of didn't mean to say what it says there. I
didn't sit down and help to make up this
sentence. . . .
(Depo. of Daynes at 50, 55-56)
Regarding causation, Dr. Daynes acknowledged James L.
Guinn, D.M.D., as an expert in temporomandibular joint
dysfunction and one to whom he would defer and look for
guidance regarding issues of bite alignment and T.M.J.
dysfunction.

(Depo. of Daynes at 25-26)

Dr. Daynes also

testified that he does not disagree with or dispute Dr. Guinn's
finding that plaintiff's symptoms are not explained by any jaw
or temporomandibular joint problems and that, in his opinion,
her jaw and bite have not been adversely altered or affected in
any way by her orthodontic treatment.

(R. at 28, Aff'd of

James L. Guinn, D.M.D. 1[ 4; Depo. of Daynes at 38) Additionally, after identifying approximately a dozen possible causes
of plaintiff's symptoms, Dr. Daynes testified as follows:
Q.
And as I understand your testimony, of all those
possible causes of Mary's symptoms, you're not able to
express an opinion as to what the actual cause is?
A.

Absolutely.

I wouldn't try to.

Q.
I'll hand you deposition exhibit 3 to your
deposition, which is a copy of the affidavit you've
previously signed, I believe, at Mr. Maori's request;
is that correct?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
Would it be fair, then, based on the testimony
you have given, to say that any references in your
affidavit to bite or T.M.J, problems as a cause of
Mary's symptoms were intended only to be an expression
by you that was a possible or one of many possible
causes?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Did you intend in any way to express an opinion
by that affidavit that bite or T.M.J, problems were
the cause of Mary's symptoms?
A.
Not directly. I had no strong feeling and have
none, and I hoped I presented none, that these
problems, particularly the T.M.J, problem, resulted
directly from her orthodontic treatment. All I felt
was that there is a possible link, and "possible" is
the word that's most important there, not that it's
caused or a direct connection.
(Depo. of Daynes at 43-46)
Perhaps Dr. Daynes' testimony regarding "the intended
meaning of his affidavit is best summarized by the following
questions asked by plaintiff's counsel and Dr. Daynes' answers
thereto:

Mr. Macri Q: And do you recall when I suggested Mary
was to come in to you what the purpose was? It wasn't
to treat her; is that correct?
A.
No. No, it wasn't to treat her; it was to give
an evaluation or just to "look at Mary."
Q.
And wasn't it true and reflected by the affidavit, defendant's exhibit 3, that the statements were
designed to convey the message that a restructuring of
teeth can cause alignment problems which cause pain
and stress and are consistent with T.M.J.?
A.
Yes. By what you're saying, that it's possible,
an orthodontic cause can be considered as to why
there's a T.M.J, problem, yes, I would agree with that
along with the other problems which may cause a T.M.J,
problem that we mentioned.
Q.

And you weren't asked anything about Dr. Hurst?

A.

I don't think his name was mentioned, no.

Q.
And the words "dentally mistreated" were the
words that I chose to describe?
A.

Yes.

You wrote this up and I—You wrote it.

(Depo. of Daynes at 60, 61)
Clearly, Dr. Daynes retracted any suggestion or implication
in his affidavit that Dr. Hurst breached the applicable standard
of care.

Additionally he explained that all he ever intended

to suggest or state in the affidavit regarding causation was
that orthodontic treatment is one of many possible causes of
the plaintiff's alleged symptoms.
Dr. Daynes is unable and unwilling to testify that
Dr. Hurst's treatment of plaintiff was improper or breached the
standard of care ordinarily exercised by other orthodontists or
that Dr. Hurst's treatment, whether negligent or not, is a

cause of plaintiff's alleged injuries.

Accordingly, based on

Dr. Daynes' deposition testimony, the trial court was correct
in concluding that Dr. Daynes' testimony does not raise a
question of fact as to whether Dr. Hurst's treatment complied
with the applicable standard of care or whether his treatment
caused plaintiff's alleged injuries.

Summary judgment was

therefore appropriate.
B.

Plaintiff Was Given Adequate Time And Opportunity To
Consult Experts And Produce Competent Opposing
Affidavits In Accordance With Rule 56(e), Utah Rules
Of Civil Procedure.

On June 6, 1988, the day set for hearing Dr. Hurst's Second
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Publish Deposition of
Scott P. Daynes, D.D.S., plaintiff filed a Motion for
Continuance, asking the court to continue the hearing for at
least three weeks.

(R. at 176)

The trial court denied plain-

tiff's motion and on appeal plaintiff claims the lower court
abused its discretion.
The trial court initially granted Summary Judgment in
December 1987.

Thereafter plaintiff filed the affidavit of

Scott Daynes, D.D.S.

His affidavit did not comply with Rule

56(e), Utah R. Civ. P. because it did not affirmatively show
that Dr. Daynes was competent to testify to the matters stated
therein.

Specifically, the affidavit did not state that

Dr. Daynes had any knowledge or familiarity with the standard
of care ordinarily exercised by orthodontists in 1972 through
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1974.

Perhaps more importantly, the affidavit did not express

an opinion that Dr. Hurst's treatment caused or probably caused
plaintiff's alleged injuries.

Nevertheless, the trial court

showed great leniency to plaintiff and allowed her a second
chance by vacating the Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff served her Notice of Intent to Commence a
Malpractice Action pursuant to the Health Care Malpractice Act
in December 1985.

(R. at 2, Complaint 1f 4)

The Summary

Judgment from which she appeals was granted in June 1988.
at 196-197)

(R.

Thus, plaintiff had two years and five months from

the time she formally asserted a claim of malpractice against
Dr. Hurst to obtain expert testimony in support of her claims
before the Summary Judgment was finally entered.

This lawsuit

had been pending for ten months when the Summary Judgment was
finally granted.

Defendant's first Motion for Summary Judgment

and the supporting affidavits were filed on November 2, 1987.
(R. at 15-46)

By vacating the first Summary Judgment, the

trial court allowed plaintiff seven months from the time the
Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting affidavits were
filed to produce counter-affidavits raising a question of fact,
before Summary Judgment was finally entered.
Plaintiff correctly identifies the standard for this
Court's review of the trial court's refusal to grant plaintiff
additional time as "abuse of discretion".
p. 9)

(Appellant's Brief,

Clearly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion

in refusing to grant plaintiff more time, when she had already
been allowed seven months to produce counter-affidavits,
particularly in view of the fact that plaintiff had asserted
her claims of malpractice nearly two and one-half years
earlier.

In exercising its discretion, the trial court could

properly consider the rights of the defendant to have claims of
professional negligence against him promptly resolved.
C.

The Doctrine Of Res Ipsa Loquitur Is Not Applicable In
This Case And Even If It Were Applicable, Competent
Expert Testimony Would Be Necessary To Raise A
Question Of Fact Regarding Causation.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court should have
recognized the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and therefore
should not have granted summary judgment.
at 5)

(Appellant's Brief

Plaintiff's position is without merit for the following

reasons:
1.

Res ipsa was not raised by plaintiff's pleadings or

arguments in the trial court.

This Court has consistently held

it will not consider issues which were not properly raised
below.

Sorenson v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah S. Ct. 1987);

Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah S. Ct. 1987).
2.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to

the facts of this case.

In order to rely on res ipsa loquitur

a plaintiff must establish a sufficient evidentiary foundation
to support application of the doctrine, including:

a.

That the accident was of a kind which, in the

ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the
defendant used due care,
b.

That the instrument or thing causing the injury

was under the management and control of the defendant, and
c.

That the accident happened irrespective of any

participation by the plaintiff.
Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra; Talbot v. Dr. W. H. Groves, Latter
Day Saints Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872 (1968);
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) .
In this case it clearly cannot be said that plaintiffs
injuries probably would not have occurred without negligence by
the defendant, or that the instrument or thing causing the
injury was under the management of the defendant, or that plaintiff's alleged injuries happened irrespective of her participation.

According to Dr. Daynes, the symptoms of which plaintiff

complains could have been caused by numerous factors not under
the control of Dr. Hurst, including factors directly involving
plaintiff's participation.

Regarding the symptoms plaintiff

claims resulted from Dr. Hursts' treatment, Dr. Daynes
testified:
Q.
And isn't it true that those symptoms can be
caused by a lot of different problems or factors?
A.
Yes sir, absolutely. There's no feeling on my
part that the fact that she has these symptoms means
that she has a T.M.J, problem. They may be caused by

a skeletal abnormality, a growth abnormality, or some
other thing I'm not able to think of right now, but
other things may cause these, all of which I may not
be able to define or know. All I can say is there was
a possibility of T.M.J, problem because all those
things are made better by the splint.
Q.
You're just suggesting that T.M.J, dysfunction is
one of many possible causes of those symptoms?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Would those other causes include hereditary
factors?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Trauma?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Even fetal development?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Arthritis?

A.
Developmental. I would include all developmental, possibly neoplastic, which means deformation
of the developing symptoms, the growth structures.
Q.

Psychological factors.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Anything that causes stress?

A.
Yes. And I would include in there any lifestyle
problems. In other words, where I mentioned earlier
about the lifestyle problems may be causing the T.M.J,
symptoms.
Q.

Things such as drug abuse?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
Excessive yawning or opening the mouth
excessively wide?
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A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Grinding or clenching of her teeth?

f\.

X c* £> .

Q.

The aging process itself may contribute?

A.

Yes, sir.

•

.

.

Q.
And probably a host of other things we haven't
even identified.
A.
Very much so, and we may not ever be able to
identify.
Q.
And as I understand your testimony, of all those
possible causes of Mary's symptoms, you're not able to
express an opinion as to what the actual cause is?
A.

Absolutely.

I wouldn't try to.

(Depo. of Daynes at 43-45)
Based on Dr. Daynes' testimony, plaintiff's alleged
injuries are not of a kind which would not have happened without negligence on the part of defendant.

Numerous instruments

or factors potentially causing plaintiff's alleged injuries
were not under the control or management of Dr. Hurst and many
of the potential causes of her alleged injuries involve
plaintiff's participation.

Accordingly, the doctrine of res

ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case.
In Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra, the
plaintiff entered the defendant hospital for a tonsillectomy.
During her hospital stay the plaintiff was given three injections in her left hip.

The day after her discharge from the

hospital, the plaintiff was readmitted with extreme pain and
inflammation at the injection site and in serious septic
shock.

At the time of her readmission, the physicians involved

concluded that the infecting organism was Clostridia introduced
by the needles used for plaintiff's injections.

Surgery was

performed, but later culture results showed the infecting
organism was beta streptococcus, the most typical cause of
common tonsillitis, rather than Clostridium.

The defendant

hospital filed a motion for summary judgment based on supporting affidavits of one of the physicians and the nurses who
administered the injections.

The affidavits averred that the

shots had been given in accordance with accepted standards of
practice for sterility and administration of injections.

The

doctor's affidavit stated that it was probable the plaintiff's
tonsils were infected with beta strep bacteria and that the
infection probably spread from her throat to the injection site
either internally through her blood stream or externally by
plaintiff or someone else handling the injection site.

The

plaintiff did not file any counter-affidavits, but relied upon
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, arguing that based thereon
she was not required to produce expert testimony to controvert
the affidavits filed by the defendant.

Plaintiff further

argued that even if she were required to produce expert
testimony, she was not required to do so before trial.

The

trial court rejected plaintiff's arguments and granted summary
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judgment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment

stating:
The evidence in this case, even when viewed most
favorably to Robinson, does not present sufficient
foundation for the application of res ipsa loquitur.
There is no expert testimony in the record from which
it could reasonably be concluded that Robinson's infection ordinarily would not happen in the absence of
negligence. Although she did not have to rule out all
other possible non-negligent causes, she did have to
offer evidence showing that the balance of probabilities weighed in favor of negligence.
In order to create a genuine factual dispute on this
point, Robinson thus had to come forward with evidence
to counter Dr. Burke's affidavit opinion—that
non-negligent causes of her infection were
probable—with expert testimony to the effect that
Robinson's infection most likely resulted from
negligence, assuming it was possible to find an expert
who could and would make such a statement. . . .
Since appellant did not submit evidence creating a
genuine issue of fact about the most likely cause of
her injuries, the trial judge properly proceeded to
conclude that respondents were entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
We agree that trial courts should be extremely
cautious in granting summary judgment for a defendant
on the basis that plaintiff has failed to secure
expert testimony to support a medical negligence
action. But appellant contends that a plaintiff suing
on a theory of res ipsa loquitur is always entitled to
a trial on the merits, so that summary judgment is
always inappropriate. Such an argument miscomprehends
the purpose and application of the doctrine, as well
as the pretrial responsibilities of a plaintiff faced
with a summary judgment motion.
Id. at 266-267.
3.

Even if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were

applicable, summary judgment would be appropriate because there
is no genuine issue of fact regarding causation.

In Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care/ Inc., supra, the
Court of Appeals explained:
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in
the proof of negligence; it has no bearing on the
issue of causation, which must be separately and
independently established.
Id. at 266.
There is no expert opinion or other competent evidence in
the record controverting the affidavits of Dr. Hurst, Dr.
Randle, Dr. Guinn, Dr. Rasmussen and Dr. Parker, all of which
establish that plaintiff's alleged injuries were not caused by
Dr. Hurst's orthodontic treatment.
D.

Plaintiff Has Not Stated A Claim For Relief Based On
Lack Of Informed Consent.

In her brief on appeal, plaintiff argues that she did not
give informed consent to the procedures performed by Dr. Hurst
when she was twelve years old.

(Appellant's Brief at 7)

Plaintiff's argument is without merit for the following reasons
1.

Her Complaint does not allege a cause of action based

on lack of informed consent and that theory was not otherwise
raised in the trial court and therefore cannot be considered by
this Court on appeal.

Sorenson v. Larsen, supra; Topik v.

Thurber, supra.
2.

One of the elements of a cause of action for failure

to obtain informed consent which must be proved by the plaintiff is that "the unauthorized part of the health care rendered

was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by the
patient".

S 78-14-5(l)(c) & (g), U.C.A. (1953 as amended).

The treatment rendered when plaintiff was eleven or twelve
years old was the extraction of the incisor and the orthodontic
treatment commenced in 1972 and concluded in 1974.

Even under

a theory of failure to obtain informed consent, plaintiff would
have the burden of proving that such treatment caused her
alleged injuries.

As discussed above, the testimony of

Dr. Hurst, Dr. Randle, Dr. Guinn, Dr. Rasmussen and Dr. Parker
is uncontroverted and there is no genuine issue in the record
regarding causation.
3.

There is no genuine issue of fact in this case

regarding plaintiff's consent to the treatment rendered by
Dr. Hurst.

Any parent is authorized and empowered to consent

to health care for his minor child.
(1953 as amended)

S 78-14-5(4)(a), U.C.A.

According to the affidavits of Dr. Hurst and

Dr. Rasmussen, the extraction of plaintiff's incisor and the
plan for orthodontic treatment were discussed with plaintiff's
father and he agreed with the plan of treatment.

(R. at 16,

Aff'd of Hurst 1f 4; R. at 38, Aff'd of Rasmussen 1f 4)

Gayle

Dean Hunt, plaintiff's father, whose affidavit was filed after
the affidavits of Dr. Hurst and Dr. Rasmussen were filed, does
not controvert the testimony of Dr. Hurst and Dr. Rasmussen
that he agreed to the proposed treatment.

He testifies:

I am Mary Alene Hunt's father. I accompanied Mary to
consult Dr. Hurst after his examination of her teeth.
She had sustained a chipped front tooth and the same
commenced to lean but was not capped and died.
Dr. Hurst proposed removal of same moving the adjoining teeth together to fill the resulting gap or
space. I questioned moving teeth but was assured it
was a regular procedure.
(R. at 66) Accordingly, the uncontroverted facts in the record
are that Dr. Hurst explained the proposed treatment to plaintiff's father and her general dentist and they agreed to the
treatment, including extraction of the incisor and the application of orthodontic appliances.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE
PROVISIONS OF § 78-14-4, U.C.A. (1953 AS
AMENDED) BECAUSE THIS ACTION WAS NOT
COMMENCED WITHIN FOUR YEARS AFTER THE
ALLEGED NEGLIGENT TREATMENT WHICH PLAINTIFF
CLAIMS CAUSED HER ALLEGED INJURIES.
Section 78-14-4 provides:
No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed
four years after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence, . . . (emphasis added)
Although plaintiff alleges Dr. Hurst's treatment continued
through 1985, the acts she claims were negligent were the
extraction of the lower right central incisor and moving the
other lower anterior teeth to fill the space left by the

extraction.

Plaintiff wore retainers subsequent to 1974, but

it is uncontroverted that the incisor was extracted in 1972 and
that by the end of 1974 the remaining lower anterior teeth had
been moved to reduce the crowding and had evenly taken up the
space of the extracted tooth.

(R. at 17, Aff'd of Hurst; R. at

38, Aff'd of Rasmussen 1f1f 5 & 6)
This Court recently reviewed the application of the four
year statute of repose in § 78-14-4, in a similar case.

In

Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah S. Ct. 1987),
Dr. Larsen, the defendant, performed corrective surgery on
plaintiffs ankle in May 1973.

In February 1982, the plaintiff

allegedly discovered that the surgery had been negligently
performed and in December 1982 he commenced the lawsuit.

The

plaintiff argued his complaint was timely because it was filed
within two years of the date his injury was discovered and that
to apply the four statute of repose in his case would result in
his claim being extinguished before it was discovered.

The

trial court granted summary judgment and this court affirmed
holding:
The trial court appropriately observed that the foregoing statute is stated in two parts. It is not only
a statute of limitation; it is also a statute of
repose. The statute begins to run from the time an
injured person knows or should know that he has suffered an injury. But in any event, the statute
requires that an action be commenced within four years
after the date of the incident which caused the injury.
Id. at 1337.

There is no dispute that the treatment which plaintiff
claims caused her injuries occurred in 1972 through 1974.
Accordingly, her claims are barred as a matter of law by the
provisions of § 78-14-4.
POINT III
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF
HAS FAILED TO CITE ANY PORTION OF THE RECORD
WHICH FACTUALLY SUPPORTS HER CONTENTIONS ON
APPEAL.
This Court has consistently held that it will assume the
correctness of the judgment below, where, as here, an appellant
does not support facts set forth in his or her brief with
citations to the record.

Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah

S. Ct. 1987); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah S. Ct.
1982).

In State v. Tucker, supra, this Court held:

A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer
to any portion of the record that factually supports
his contention on appeal. This Court will assume the
correctness of the judgment below where counsel on
appeal does not comply with the requirements of Rule
75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to
making a concise statement of facts and citation of
the pages in the record where they are supported.1
Id. at 756-757.

*Rule 24(a)(7) and (e), Rules of Utah Supreme Court, became
effective in April 1987 and essentially replaced former Rule
75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but did not
change the requirement that an appellant's brief contain a
statement of facts supported by citations to the record.
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In this case, appellant's brief does not contain a single
citation to the record.

Accordingly, there are no facts

properly cited to this Court upon which reversal of the
judgment of the lower court could be based.

It is impossible

for plaintiff to demonstrate that a question of fact existed
without citing facts in the record.

The Summary Judgment

should therefore be affirmed.
POINT IV
THE COURT SHOULD AWARD DR. HURST COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES BECAUSE THE APPEAL IS
FRIVOLOUS AND BECAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE COURT'S RULES.
Rule 33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, provides for
an award of damages and single or double costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, if the Court determines that an
appeal is frivolous.

The Utah Court of Appeals has held that a

frivolous appeal is one having no reasonable legal or factual
basis and that lack of good faith is not required to find an
appeal frivolous.

O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App.

1987) .
This appeal is without reasonable legal or factual basis.
As discussed above, not a single citation to the record is made
in appellant's brief.

Without citing the record, no reasonable

factual basis for the appeal can be demonstrated.

At least two

arguments raised by plaintiff on appeal were never raised in

the trial court; res ipsa loquitur and failure to obtain
informed consent.

This Court has consistently held that it

will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal,
but plaintiff has ignored that basic time honored rule without
suggesting any reason why this Court should consider those
arguments.

Plaintiff has filled the record in this case with

clearly inadmissible materials, without any good faith effort
to provide the required foundation.

(See Addendum hereto)

Additionally, plaintiff has attempted to put before this Court,
two purported expert witness affidavits, which were never
before the trial court.

(Dennis J. Michaelson, D.M.D., M.S.

included as an unnumbered page of the record and filed with the
District Court more than two months after the Notice of Appeal
was filed and the purported letter from Grant B. Cannon,
D.D.S., M.D., Exhibit 10 to Appellant's brief, but not in the
record.)
For the foregoing reasons, defendant submits that this
appeal has no reasonable legal or factual basis and that
plaintiff's blatant disregard for the rules of this Court and
the Rules of Civil Procedure demonstrate bad faith and the
frivolous nature of the appeal.

Such conduct has greatly and

unnecessarily increased the cost of defending this action.
Accordingly, defendant requests that just damages, including
double costs and reasonable attorneys' fees be awarded to him.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, Dr. Hurst respectfully
requests that the Order and Summary Judgment entered by the
District Court be affirmed and that he be awarded double costs
and attorneys' fees incurred because of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of December, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

SCMDGW153

L^^/>7*
David 6/ Williams
Attorneys for J. Earl Hurst,
D.D.S., M.S., Defendant and
Respondent

ADDENDUM
Following is a list of the materials, exclusive of
Dr. Daynes' affidavit, submitted to the trial court and to this
Court by plaintiff, purportedly in support of her claim that
Dr. Hurst was negligent and that his treatment proximately
caused her alleged injuries.

Also set forth are reasons these

materials do not raise a question of fact regarding the
propriety of Dr. Hurst's treatment or causation.

The various

affidavits of plaintiff, her father, and Charles Edward Gordon
are not included, as none of them purport to have any dental
training or other qualifications as expert witnesses.
1.

Letter from Joseph W. Stobbe, Jr., D.M.D. dated

December 17, 1987.

(R. at 70)

Dr. Stobbe's letter is not

signed under oath and does not affirmatively show that he is
competent to testify as an expert, as required by Rule 56(e),
Utah R. Civ. P.

Moreover, this letter does not purport to

address whether Dr. Hurst's treatment was appropriate or
whether his treatment caused plaintiff's alleged injuries.
2.
1988.

Affidavit of Dallas E. Murdoch, D.D.S., dated May 4,
(R. at 175) Dr. Murdoch's affidavit does not state that

he has any familiarity with the standard of care ordinarily
exercised by orthodontists and does not otherwise affirmatively
show that he is competent to testify as an expert.

Addition-

ally, Dr. Murdoch does not express any opinion regarding the

standard of care applicable to Dr. Hurst or regarding whether
Dr. Hurst's treatment was within the applicable standard of
care.

At most, he suggests that the type of occlusal relation-

ship plaintiff had in May 1988 "can" trigger a variety of
health problems.

He does not express an opinion that plain-

tiff's alleged injuries were or probably were caused by her
orthodontic treatment.
3.

Excerpt of Lecture to Dentists, September 1986, by

Dr. Henry Tanner.

(R. at 183-184)

This document was submitted

to the trial court on June 13, 1988, a week after the second
Summary Judgment was granted.
foundation.

It was submitted without any

It is not in affidavit form or attached to or

incorporated in an affidavit.

Additionally, the document does

not purport to address the standard of care applicable to
orthodontists in treating cases such as plaintiff presented to
Dr. Hurst and does not purport to address the cause of plaintiff's alleged injuries.
According to the court's file (R. at 199) a cassette tape,
purportedly the tape from which this excerpt was transcribed,
was also submitted to the court on June 14, 1988.

The tape has

all the same evidentiary deficiencies, including specifically a
total lack of foundation.

The content of the tape is unknown

because it was not offered or played at any hearing and was
never provided to Dr. Hurst or his counsel.
4.
at 185)

Affidavit of John R. Bybee, dated June 13, 1988.

(R.

This affidavit was also submitted to the trial court a
-2-

week after the second Summary Judgment was entered.

It states

John R. Bybee has a Ph.D. in "physiology and the training of
science teachers", but does not affirmatively state any qualifications making him competent to testify regarding the standard
of care exercised by orthodontists or the cause of plaintiff's
alleged injuries.

Additionally, the affidavit does not state

that John Bybee is familiar with the treatment rendered by
Dr. Hurst and does not address the propriety of such treatment
or express any opinion as to the cause of plaintiff's alleged
injuries.
5.

Letters and proposed contract addressed to Robert

Macri from Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys and The
Medical Quality Foundation.

(R. at 192-195)

These are

materials sent to plaintiff's counsel by an expert witness
locating agency.

They were filed with the court a week after

the second Summary Judgment was granted.

The materials do not

contain any expert opinions regarding Dr. Hurst's treatment or
the cause of plaintiff's problems and obviously do not comply
with Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P. with respect to the form of
evidence submitted to controvert affidavits filed in support of
a motion for summary judgment.
6.

Letter dated June 14, 1988, from Gordon J.

Christensen, D.D.S., Ph.D.

(R. at 204)

This letter was filed

with the court on June 21, 1988, two weeks after the Second
Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

The letter is not

signed under oath.

It is not signed by Dr. Christensen.

It

does not affirmatively show that Dr. Christensen or the person
signing the letter is competent to testify regarding the issues
in this case.

The letter does not express any opinion that

Dr. Hurst's treatment was negligent or in any way inappropriate.
7.

Handwritten note dated June 15, 1988 from John Richard

Oaki, M.P.

(R. at 205) Again, this note is not in the form

prescribed by Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P. for evidence submitted to controvert affidavits filed in support of motions for
summary judgment.

It was also filed two weeks after the Second

Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

Dr. Aoki, according

to the material submitted, is an otorhinolaryngologist and
there is no indication that he claims any familiarity with the
standard of care exercised by orthodontists.

He does not

express an opinion concerning the propriety of the treatment
rendered by Dr. Hurst.
8.

Affidavit of Dennis J. Michaelson, P.M.P., M.S. dated

September 13, 1988.

This affidavit is the last document, other

than the clerk's index, in the court file and is not numbered
as part of the record.

It was filed September 20, 1988, more

than two months after the notice of appeal was filed.

Again,

this affidavit does not affirmatively show that the affiant is
competent to testify as an expert regarding the issues in this
case.

The affiant does not state that he has any familiarity

with the treatment rendered to plaintiff by Pr. Hurst and does

not express an opinion concerning the propriety of Dr. Hurst's
treatment.

He opines that in September 1988 plaintiff had some

occlusal and dentally related problems, but does not express
any opinion regarding the cause of such problems.
9.

Letter dated July 8, 1988, from Grant B. Cannon,

D.D.S., M.D.

This letter is Exhibit 10 to Appellant's brief,

but is not found in the record or in the court file. Again,
this letter does not comply with the requirements of Rule
56(e), Utah R. Civ. P., for evidence submitted to controvert
affidavits filed in support of motions for summary judgment.
The letter does not affirmatively show that Dr. Cannon is
familiar with the standard of care exercised by orthodontists.
The letter is not signed under oath.

Furthermore, Dr. Cannon

does not purport to express an opinion that Dr. Hurst's
treatment was in any way inappropriate or caused plaintiff's
alleged injuries.
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